Q: In 2003, Padua was charged for violating R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. He was seventeen years old at that time. He was convicted in 2004. He subsequently appealed to the CA and thereafter to the SC. Can he validly claim that his rights under RA 9344, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2006” were violated?
A: No. Suspension of sentence under RA 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Sec. 40 of RA 9344 provides that once the child reaches the age of 18 years, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspension of sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Padua has already reached 21 years of age and thus could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying RA 9344. (Padua vs. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008)
Q: De Guzman was charged and convicted of rape. Decision became final and executory. Subsequently, De Guzman and the offended party contracted marriage. Is his criminal liability extinguished?
A: Yes. Art. 89 of the RPC states that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the marriage of the offended woman. Art. 344 also states that in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. (People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010)
Q: Jarillo married Alocillo in 1974. In 1979, Jarillo married Uy while the first marriage was subsisting. Uy filed a case for bigamy in 1999. Jarillo claimed that the action has already prescribed inasmuch as Uy already knew about her previous marriage as far back as 1978. Decide.
A: Jarillo’s contention is untenable. The crime of bigamy prescribes in 15 years. The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. In this case, Jarillo failed to prove that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978. Her defense is therefore ineffectual. (Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009; see also Sermonia vs. CA, 233 SCRA 151)
Q: Ronald was convicted and subsequently granted probation. One of the terms and conditions of his probation is the indemnification of the heirs of the victim. The court subsequently directed him to submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him. Ronald failed to do so. Can his probation be revoked?
A: Yes. Probation is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the trial court. Its grant is subject to terms and conditions that may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that it also has the power to order its revocation. Having violated the terms and condition of his probation, he must now serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Soriano vs. CA, G.R. No. 123936, March 4, 1999)
Q: Guinhawa sold a Mitsubishi van to Spouses Silo. He told the spouses that the vehicle was brand new when in fact he knew that it isn’t. It already figured in an accident and he just had it repaired. The Spouses discovered the concealment and filed a complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Art. 318 of the RPC, or the crime of OTHER DECEITS. Is Guinhawa liable?
A: Yes. The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Art. 318 of the RPC. This provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Arts. 315 to 317 of the RPC. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and intendment. It is evident that such false statement or fraudulent representation constituted the very cause or the only motive for the spouses to part with their property. (Guinhawa vs. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005)
Q: R issued a check to P but the same bounced. R was charged for ESTAFA under the RPC. Subsequently, he was charged with violation of B.P. 22 for the same set of facts. Can P recover civil liability in both cases?
A: No. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: Estafa and violation of BP 22. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. (Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005)
Q: Dr. Ampil performed hysterectomy on Natividad Agana in Medical City. A few days after, Natividad complained of severe pain. Another doctor discovered that a gauze had been left inside her body that caused infection. Natividad died. Is the doctor and the hospital solidarily liable?
A: Yes. For purposes of apportionment of the responsibility in medical services cases an Employer-Employee relationship exists between doctors and hospitals including medical consultants. Reasons: 1. Hospitals exercise control in the hiring and firing of the doctors 2. Performance of doctors consultants are generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality statistics and feedbacks from patients, nurses and interns 3. The private hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control on the staff of the medical hospital. If the private hospital is owned by a private corporation, such corporation can be held liable on the basis of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility. As the owner of the hospital it is its responsibility to supervise its doctors including its consultants, and the treatment prescribed to its patients. Consequently, both are jointly and severally liable to the Aganas. (PSI vs. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, February 2, 2010)
Q: If the accused committed a heinous crime under R.A. 7659 punishable by death, the offended party is entitled to 75,000 by way of indemnity and 50,000 by way of moral damages but now under R.A. 9346, the death penalty is proscribed and it is prohibited to impose the death penalty. How much is the indemnity in favour of the offended party and the moral damages to the heirs?
A: The amount of indemnity remains the same. R.A. 9346 did not eliminate the death penalty. It remains but what is prohibited is its imposition. There is still a heinous crime but death penalty cannot be imposed. Moreover, the amount of damages is controlled by the NCC and not the RPC. Therefore, the amount still remains. (Quiachon v. People 500 SCRA 704; see also People vs. Catubig G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001)
Q: Dela Cuesta, a district supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools, was in the district office when a certain Justo asked him to accommodate Miss Racela as a teacher in his district. Dela Cuesta told Justo that there was no vacancy. Justo got angry and challenged Dela Cuesta to fight outside, which the latter allegedly accepted. When they were in front of the table of a clerk in the office, Justo grabbed the collar and polo shirt of Dela Cuesta and boxed him several times. Is Justo liable for direct assault?
A: Yes. Dela Cuesta was not disrobed of the mantle of authority and the privilege of protection of a person in authority by the mere fact that he accepted Justo’s challenge. The character of persons in authority is not assumed or laid off at will but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant was not actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority; as long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty, past or present, and even if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being discharged. (Justo vs. CA, G.R. No. L-8611, June 28, 1956)
Q: PAGCOR gave Monteverde, a barangay official, money for the lighting and beautification of the barangay. Monteverde submitted a financial statement with copies of sales invoices toPAGCOR. He was charged with falsification of a public document. Can she be held liable?
A: Yes. A person can be held liable for falsification of a public document even though it was a private document at the time of its falsification as long as it is intended by law to be part of the public or official record. In this case, the sales invoice formed part of the official records of PAGCOR when it was submitted by Monteverde as one of the supporting papers for the liquidation of her accountability to PAGCOR. However, the prosecution must prove the accused’s guilty beyond reasonable doubt in committing the crime of falsification of a public document. (See Monteverde vs. People, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002)
Q: Iluminado, a techer clerk, died. Thereafter, the Bureau of Public schools sent the deceased’s salary warrants, three in all. Her wife, Pilar, endorsed the treasury warrants to encash the same. She signed the name of her husband as payee for purposes of endorsement. She was charged with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. Is Pilar liable?
A: No. There is no criminal intent on the part of Pilar because she believed in good faith that she is entitled to the proceeds of the salary warrant. Moreover, the government did not sustain financial loss due to encashment of checks by the wife, as her husband had left accumulated vacation and sick leaves which exceeded the value of the checks. This does not mean that if there is no damage, there is no falsification. The point here is that absence of damage is an element to be considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent. (Luague vs. CA, G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04, February 22, 1982)
Q: Bernabe, an alleged arsonist, was summoned by Mendoza, a lieutenant of the barrio, to his office after the owner of the burnt house reported the incident. However, the latter took no action whatsoever, nor did he report the facts to the proper higher authority. He even allowed Bernabe to return home. Mendoza was charged as accessory after the fact in the crime of arson. Bernabe was acquitted. Is Mendoza liable?
A: No. The responsibility of the accessory after the fact is subordinate to that of the principal in a crime, because the accessory’s participation therein is subsequent to its commission, and his guilt is very directly related to the principal delinquent in the punishable act. In the case at bar, it is neither possible nor proper to convict Mendoza as accessory after the fact of Bernabe who was acquitted of the said crime of arson. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 7540, September 23, 1912)
Q: Merencillo, an examiner of the BIR, demanded money from a taxpayer in exchange for the approval of a certificate authorizing registration. An entrapment operation was conducted where Merencillo was caught in the act receiving the money. He was charged for violating R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and direct bribery under the RPC. Is there double jeopardy in this case?
A: No. Sec. 3 of RA 3019 provides that “in addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law”. One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the RPC for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code. (Merencillo vs. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13, 2007)
Q: Tad-y, a structural analyst of the Office of the City Engineer of Bacolod City, allegedly demanded money from Encabo for the issuance of certificate of final inspection and certificate of occupancy. An entrapment operation was conducted where Tad-y supposedly received the money. Can Tad-y be held liable for direct bribery?
A: To be liable for bribery, it is sufficient if the actions of the government officer, affected by the bribe, are part of any established procedure consistent with the authority of the government agency. However, where the act is entirely outside of the official functions of the officer to whom the money is offered, the offense is not bribery. In this case, it is incredible why Tad-y would demand the said amount as precondition to his signing a certificate of occupancy considering that it is only the Building Official who is specifically vested with authority to sign said certificate. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Tad-y demanded the money. The circumstances surrounding the entrapment also disprove any intention on the part of Tad-y to accept the money and consider it his own. (Tad-y vs. People, G.R. No. 148862, August 11, 2005)
Q: Sazon, a Senior Management Specialist of the DENR, demanded from R&R Shipyard supporting documents for the banned species of logs found in the latter’s premises. R&R failed to provide the documents. Sazon then demanded P100,000.00 from R&R accompanied by threats of prosecution and confiscation of the logs. He received the money in an entrapment operation. Is Sazon liable for the crime of robbery extortion?
A: Yes. In robbery there must be intent to gain and unlawful taking or apoderamiento, which is defined as the taking of items without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. In the instant case, it is undisputed that Sazon received the money for her personal benefit, thus the elements of unlawful taking and intent to gain are present. Sazon also employed intimidation to get the P100,000.00. By using her position as Senior Management Specialist of the DENR, he succeeded in coercing R&R to choose between two alternatives: to part with their money or suffer the burden and humiliation of prosecution and confiscation of the logs. (Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009)
