Albano vs. Reyes (digest)

Albano vs. Reyes

175 SCRA 264 | Paras, J.

Facts:

The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) board directed the PPA management to prepare for the public bidding of the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) at the Port of Manila. A Bidding Committee was formed by the DOTC for the public bidding. After evaluation of several bids, the Bidding Committee recommended the award of the contract to respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI). Accordingly, Rainerio Reyes, then DOTC secretary, declared the ICTSI consortium as the winning bidder.

On May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved the same with directives that PPA shall still have the responsibility for planning, detailed engineering, construction, expansion, rehabilitation and capital dredging of the port, as well as the determination of how the revenues of the port system shall be allocated for future works; and the contractor shall not collect taxes and duties except that in the case of wharfage or tonnage dues.

Petitioner Albano, as taxpayer and Congressman, assailed the legality of the award and claimed that since the MICT is a public utility, it needs a legislative franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility.

ISSUE: Whether a franchise is needed for the operation of the MICT?

Held: No. While the PPA has been tasked under E.O. No. 30 with the management and operation of the MICT and to undertake the provision of cargo handling and port related services thereat, the law provides that such shall be “in accordance with P.D. 857 and other applicable laws and regulations”. P.D. 857 expressly empowers the PPA to provide services within Port Districts “whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise”.

Even if the MICT is considered a public utility, its operation would not necessarily need a franchise from the legislature because the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the operation of public utilities. Reading E.O. 30 and P.D. 857 together, it is clear that the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the operation and management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by another by contract or other means, at its option.

Doctrine: The law granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for the operation of public utilities. Theory that MICT is a “wharf” or a “dock”, as contemplated under the Public Service Act, would not necessarily call for a franchise from the Legislative Branch.

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Luzon Stevedoring vs. Public Service Commission (digest)

Luzon Stevedoring Co. Inc. and Visayan Stevedore Transportation Co. vs. Public Service Commission

93 Phil. 735 | Tuason, J.

Facts: Petitioners are engaged in the stevedoring or lighterage and harbor towage business. They are also engaged in interisland service which consist of hauling cargoes such as sugar, oil, fertilizer and other commercial commodities. There is no fixed route in the transportation of these cargoes, the same being left at the indication of the owner or shipper of the goods. Petitioners, in their hauling business, serve only a limited portion of the public.

The Philippine Shipowners’ Association complained to the Public Service Commission that petitioners were engaged in the transportation of cargo in the Philippines for hire or compensation without authority or approval of the Commission. The rates petitioners charged resulted in ruinous competition.

The Public Service Commission restrained petitioners from further operating their watercraft to transport goods for hire or compensation between points in the Philippines until the commission approves the rates they propose to charge.

Issue: Whether the petitioners fall under the definition in Section 13 (b) of the Public Service Law (C.A. Act No. 146)?

Held: Yes. It is not necessary under said definition that one holds himself out as serving or willing to serve the public in order to be considered public service. It is not necessary, in order to be a public service, that an organization be dedicated to public use, i.e., ready and willing to serve the public as a class. It is only necessary that it must in some way be impressed with a public interest; and whether the operation of a business is a public utility depends upon whether or not the service rendered by it is of a public character and of public consequence and concern.

It can scarcely be denied that the contracts between the owners of the barges and the owners of the cargo at bar were ordinary contracts of transportation and not of lease. Petitioners’ watercraft was manned entirely by crews in their employ and payroll, and the operation of the said craft was under their direction and control, the customers assuming no responsibility for the goods handled on the barges.

C.A. No. 146 clearly declares that an enterprise of any of the kinds therein enumerated is a public service if conducted for hire or compensation even if the operator deals only with a portion of the public or limited clientele. Public utility, even where the term is not defined by statute, is not determined by the number of people actually served.

The Public Service Law was enacted not only to protect the public against unreasonable charges and poor, inefficient service, but also to prevent ruinous competition.

Just as the legislature may not declare a company or enterprise to be a public utility when it is not inherently such, a public utility may not evade control and supervision of its operation by the government by selecting its customers under the guise of private transactions.

Doctrine: An enterprise of any of the kinds enumerated in the Public Service Law is a public service if conducted for hire or compensation even if the operator deals only with a portion of the public or with limited clientele.

Cristobal vs. Gomez (digest)

Cristobal vs. Gomez

50 Phil. 810

Facts:

Epifanio Gomez owns two parcels of land located in the Jabay, Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite and a lot located in town of Bacoor, Cavite. He sold the property with Pacto de Retro to Luis Yangco, redeemable in five years. The period to redeem expired but Yangco extended it. Gomez approached Bibiano Banas , a relative, to secure a loan. The latter only agreed if Gomez’s brother Marcelino and sister Telesfora would also be responsible for the loan.

On 12 August 1907, Marcelino and Telesfora entered into a “private partnership in participation” for the purpose of redeeming the property from Yangco. Epifanio was present when said agreement was discussed and assented to. The capital consisted of P7000, of which P1500 came from Marcelino, and P5500 from Telesfora. The agreement provided that the property redeemed will be placed in the name of Marcelino and Telesfora, the income, rent, and produce of the property would go to the two and that the property shall be returned to their brother as soon as the capital employed have been covered. Epifanio should also manifest good behavior in the opinion of Marcelino and Telesfora.

More than a year later, Epifanio Gomez dies leaving Paulina Cristobal and their four children. Meanwhile, Marcelino Gomez continued to possess the property, improved it, and earned income from it. He acquired exclusive rights over it when Telesfora conveyed her interest to him. He sold the property with pacto de retro to Banas, redeemable within five years. On April 1, 1918, he redeemed the property from Banas.

Subsequently, Paulina and children filed action to recover property from Marcelino. They claimed that the capital had been covered by the property’s income, hence, the same should be returned to them. The lower court granted their petition. Marcelino appealed. Hence the present petition.

Issue: Whether there was acceptance by Epifanio of the trust agreement.

Held: Yes. Contrary to defendant’s claim that the agreement was kept secret from Epifanio, the testimony of Banas stated that Gomez was present when the arrangement for the repurchase of the property was discussed. Banas even told Epifanio to be thankful that the latter was able to recover the property from Yangco.

Defendants also claim that because Epifanio had not accepted the donation in a public document, the same is unenforceable. This is untenable. Epifanio need not accept in accordance with formalities of donations. The court said that the partnership agreement should be viewed as an express trust, not as an intended donation.

THUS: Heirs of Epifanio entitled to recover the property.

Lorenzo vs. Posadas (digest)

Lorenzo vs. Posadas

64 Phil 353

Facts:

On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal properties. Hanley’s will provides the following: his money will be given to his nephew, Matthew Hanley, as well as the real estate owned by him. It further provided that the property will only be given ten years after Thomas Hanley’s death. Thus, in the testamentary proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga appointed P.J.M. Moore as trustee of the estate. Moore took oath of office on March 10, 1924, and resigned on Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was appointed in his stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue, assessed inheritance tax against the estate amounting to P2,057.74 which includes penalty and surcharge. He filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings so that Lorenzo will be ordered to pay the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest after CFI granted Posadas’ motion. He claimed that the inheritance tax should have been assessed after 10 years. He asked for a refund but Posadas declined to do so. The latter counterclaimed for the additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on the tax and which was not included in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzo’s claim for refund against Posadas. Hence, both appealed.

Issue: Whether the estate was delinquent in paying the inheritance tax and therefore liable for the P1,191.27 that Posadas is asking for?

Held: Yes. It was delinquent because according to Sec. 1544 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, payment of the inheritance tax shall be made before delivering to each beneficiary his share. This payment should have been made before March 10, 1924, the date when P.J.M. Moore formally assumed the function of trustee.

Although the property was only to be given after 10 years from the death of Hanley, the court considered that delivery to the trustee is delivery to cestui que trust, the beneficiary within the meaning of Sec. 1544 (b).

Even though there was no express mention of the word “trust” in the will, the court of first instance was correct in appointing a trustee because no particular or technical words are required to create a testamentary trust (69 C.J.,p. 711). The requisites of a valid testamentary trust are: 1) sufficient words to raise a trust, 2) a definite subject, 3) a certain or ascertained object. There is no doubt that Hanley intended to create a trust since he ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period or for a stated purpose.

***this case was assigned in our Agency and Partnership class. I created this file as a reviewer. I decided to share it with the world, especially law students like me. hope it helped!