Albano vs. Reyes (digest)

Albano vs. Reyes

175 SCRA 264 | Paras, J.

Facts:

The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) board directed the PPA management to prepare for the public bidding of the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) at the Port of Manila. A Bidding Committee was formed by the DOTC for the public bidding. After evaluation of several bids, the Bidding Committee recommended the award of the contract to respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI). Accordingly, Rainerio Reyes, then DOTC secretary, declared the ICTSI consortium as the winning bidder.

On May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved the same with directives that PPA shall still have the responsibility for planning, detailed engineering, construction, expansion, rehabilitation and capital dredging of the port, as well as the determination of how the revenues of the port system shall be allocated for future works; and the contractor shall not collect taxes and duties except that in the case of wharfage or tonnage dues.

Petitioner Albano, as taxpayer and Congressman, assailed the legality of the award and claimed that since the MICT is a public utility, it needs a legislative franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility.

ISSUE: Whether a franchise is needed for the operation of the MICT?

Held: No. While the PPA has been tasked under E.O. No. 30 with the management and operation of the MICT and to undertake the provision of cargo handling and port related services thereat, the law provides that such shall be “in accordance with P.D. 857 and other applicable laws and regulations”. P.D. 857 expressly empowers the PPA to provide services within Port Districts “whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise”.

Even if the MICT is considered a public utility, its operation would not necessarily need a franchise from the legislature because the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the operation of public utilities. Reading E.O. 30 and P.D. 857 together, it is clear that the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the operation and management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by another by contract or other means, at its option.

Doctrine: The law granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for the operation of public utilities. Theory that MICT is a “wharf” or a “dock”, as contemplated under the Public Service Act, would not necessarily call for a franchise from the Legislative Branch.

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Luzon Stevedoring vs. Public Service Commission (digest)

Luzon Stevedoring Co. Inc. and Visayan Stevedore Transportation Co. vs. Public Service Commission

93 Phil. 735 | Tuason, J.

Facts: Petitioners are engaged in the stevedoring or lighterage and harbor towage business. They are also engaged in interisland service which consist of hauling cargoes such as sugar, oil, fertilizer and other commercial commodities. There is no fixed route in the transportation of these cargoes, the same being left at the indication of the owner or shipper of the goods. Petitioners, in their hauling business, serve only a limited portion of the public.

The Philippine Shipowners’ Association complained to the Public Service Commission that petitioners were engaged in the transportation of cargo in the Philippines for hire or compensation without authority or approval of the Commission. The rates petitioners charged resulted in ruinous competition.

The Public Service Commission restrained petitioners from further operating their watercraft to transport goods for hire or compensation between points in the Philippines until the commission approves the rates they propose to charge.

Issue: Whether the petitioners fall under the definition in Section 13 (b) of the Public Service Law (C.A. Act No. 146)?

Held: Yes. It is not necessary under said definition that one holds himself out as serving or willing to serve the public in order to be considered public service. It is not necessary, in order to be a public service, that an organization be dedicated to public use, i.e., ready and willing to serve the public as a class. It is only necessary that it must in some way be impressed with a public interest; and whether the operation of a business is a public utility depends upon whether or not the service rendered by it is of a public character and of public consequence and concern.

It can scarcely be denied that the contracts between the owners of the barges and the owners of the cargo at bar were ordinary contracts of transportation and not of lease. Petitioners’ watercraft was manned entirely by crews in their employ and payroll, and the operation of the said craft was under their direction and control, the customers assuming no responsibility for the goods handled on the barges.

C.A. No. 146 clearly declares that an enterprise of any of the kinds therein enumerated is a public service if conducted for hire or compensation even if the operator deals only with a portion of the public or limited clientele. Public utility, even where the term is not defined by statute, is not determined by the number of people actually served.

The Public Service Law was enacted not only to protect the public against unreasonable charges and poor, inefficient service, but also to prevent ruinous competition.

Just as the legislature may not declare a company or enterprise to be a public utility when it is not inherently such, a public utility may not evade control and supervision of its operation by the government by selecting its customers under the guise of private transactions.

Doctrine: An enterprise of any of the kinds enumerated in the Public Service Law is a public service if conducted for hire or compensation even if the operator deals only with a portion of the public or with limited clientele.

Cabrera vs. CA 163 SCRA 214

Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, and Felisa Gonzaga, Fernando Gonzaga, Aurora Gonzaga, et al.

163 SCRA 214

June 30, 1988

Facts: The parcel of land in dispute was originally owned by Diego and Patricio Gonzaga, the grandparents of the private respondents herein. In 1921, the tax declaration was in the name of the spouses Gonzaga. In 1944 it was made in the name of their child Eliseo Gonzaga. In 1953, it was changed again in the name of Joaquin Cabrera.

In 1970, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of the property from the petitioners in the Court of First Instance. They claimed the property by right of succession. Petitioners claimed by virtue of an alleged sale between them and Eliseo.

During the pendency of the complaint, private respondents’ request that the figures “1960” be changed to “1969” was approved without opposition from Cabrera.

CFI decided in favor of private respondents herein. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

Note: A separate action for registration of the land instituted by Cabrera was pending when the case at the CFI was being heard.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the complaint is barred by laches or prescription?

2. Whether the tax declarations serve as constructive notice because of their nature as public instruments?

3. Whether the action for reconveyance was prematurely filed?

Held:

1. No. The amendment requested by private respondents was allowed without objection from the petitioners. Moreover, this defense should have been pleaded before the amendment was made.

2. No. The Court said it’s strange doctrine that every one is deemed charged with knowledge of every public document simply because it is public in nature. There is no jurisprudence to support the claim.

3. No. The action for reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of decree of registration. There is no reason why one has to wait for the land to be registered before filing such remedy.

Cabrera’s claim that respondents had no valid grounds to support the action for reconveyance is untenable. The latter had established that the transfer of the land had been made under fraudulent circumstances. They also proved that they didn’t receive notice of the registration proceedings and that no notice had been posted on the subject land as required by law.

Carrantes vs. CA (digest)

Maximino Carrantes vs. Court of Appeals, Bilad Carrantes, Lauro Carrantes, Eduardo Carrantes, and Michael Tumpao

76 SCRA 514

Facts: Mateo Carantes, original owner of Lot No. 44 situated at Loakan, Baguio City, died in 1913 leaving his widow Ogasia, and six children, namely, Bilad, Lauro, Crispino, Maximino, Apung and Sianang,. In 1930, the government, in order to expand the landing field of the Loakan Airport, filed for the expropriation of a portion of Lot. No. 44. Said lot was subdivided into Lots. No. 44A to 44E for the purpose.

In 1913, Maximino Carrantes (MAX) was appointed the judicial administrator of the estate of Mateo. Four heirs, namely, Bilad, Lauro, Sianang, and Crisipino, executed a deed denominated “Assignment of Right to Inheritance” assigning to Max their rights over said lot in 1939. The stated monetary consideration is P1.00. On same date, Max sold Lot Nos. 44B and 44C to the government. One year later the Court of First Instance, upon joint petition of the Carrantes heirs, issued an order cancelling O.C.T. No. 3 and TCT No. 2533 was issued in its place.

On 16 March 1940, Max registered the deed of “Assignment of Right to Inheritance”. Thus, TCT No. 2533 was cancelled and TCT 2540 was issued in the name of Max. A formal deed of Sale was also executed by Max on the same date in favor of the government. Hence, TCT 2540 was cancelled and new TCTs were issued in favor of the government and Max, respectively. On 4 Sept. 1958, Bilad, Lauro, and Crispino, along with the surviving heirs of Apung and Sianang filed complaint in the CFI.

They claimed that the execution of the deed of assignment was attended by fraud. The trial court decided that the action of the heirs had already prescribed since an action on fraud prescribes on four years from discovery of such, in this case, on 16 March 1940 when Max registered the deed of assignment. The Court of Appeals reversed and found that a constructive trust was created. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: 1. whether a constructive trust involves a fiduciary relationship? 2. Whether action had already prescribed?

Held: 1. The court, assuming that there was fraud, and in turn, a constructive trust in favor of the other heirs, said that constructive trust does not involve a promise nor fiduciary relations. Hence, the respondent court’s conclusion that the rule on constructive notice does not apply because there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties lacks the necessary premise.

2. Action had already prescribed because there was constructive notice to the heirs when Maximino registered the deed of assignment with the register of deeds on 16 March 1940. Such date is the reckoning point of counting prescription based on fraud.

Anent respondent court’s contention that constructive trust is imprescriptible, the court said that it is untenable. It is already settled that constructive trusts prescribes in 10 years. In this case, the ten year period started on 16 March 1940. And since the respondents commenced the action only on 4 Sept. 1958, the same is barred by prescription.

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Ty vs. Ty (digest)

Alejandro Ty vs. Sylvia Ty

553 SCRA 306

Facts: Alexander Ty, son of Alejandro Ty and husband of Sylvia Ty, dies of cancer at the age of 34. Sylvia files petition for the settlement of Alexander’s intestate estate. She also asks court to sell or mortgage properties in order to pay the estate tax amounting to P4,714,560.02 assessed by the BIR. The properties include a parcel of land in EDSA Greenhills, a residential land in Wack Wack, and the Meridien condo unit in Annapolis, Greenhills.

Alejandro Ty opposed the move and filed for recovery of the property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Plaintiff Alejandro claims that he owns the EDSA, Wack Wack and Meridien condo unit because he paid for them. The property was supposedly registered in trust for Alexander’s brothers and sisters in case plaintiff dies. Plaintiff also claimed that Alex had no financial capacity to purchase the disputed property, as the latter was only dependent on the former.

Sylvia countered that Alexander had purchased the property with his money. Alexander was financially capable of purchasing it because he had been managing the family corporations since he was 18 years old and was also engage in other profitable businesses.

The RTC granted the application for preliminary injunction and decides in favor of plaintiff regarding the recovery of the property. CA reversed the RTC stating that the implication created by law under Art. 1448 does not apply if the property was in the name of the purchaser’s child. They agreed that plaintiff partly paid for the EDSA property. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue: whether there was an implied trust under Art. 1448 of the Civil Code?

Held: No, there was no implied trust created in relation to the EDSA property. If the person to whom the title is conveyed is the child of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law under Art. 1448, the so-called purchase money resulting trust. The said article provides an exception: “if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, NO TRUST is IMPLIED by LAW, it being disputable presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.” The Court also noted that plaintiff failed to prove that he did not intend a donation.

Regarding the Meridien Condo and Wack Wack property, the court said that plaintiff failed to prove that purchase money came from him. They also said that Alexander was capable of purchasing the property as he had been working for nine years, had a car care business, and was actively engaged in the business dealings of several family corporations from which he received emoluments and other benefits. Hence, no implied trust created because there was no proof that plaintiff had paid for said properties.

Cristobal vs. Gomez (digest)

Cristobal vs. Gomez

50 Phil. 810

Facts:

Epifanio Gomez owns two parcels of land located in the Jabay, Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite and a lot located in town of Bacoor, Cavite. He sold the property with Pacto de Retro to Luis Yangco, redeemable in five years. The period to redeem expired but Yangco extended it. Gomez approached Bibiano Banas , a relative, to secure a loan. The latter only agreed if Gomez’s brother Marcelino and sister Telesfora would also be responsible for the loan.

On 12 August 1907, Marcelino and Telesfora entered into a “private partnership in participation” for the purpose of redeeming the property from Yangco. Epifanio was present when said agreement was discussed and assented to. The capital consisted of P7000, of which P1500 came from Marcelino, and P5500 from Telesfora. The agreement provided that the property redeemed will be placed in the name of Marcelino and Telesfora, the income, rent, and produce of the property would go to the two and that the property shall be returned to their brother as soon as the capital employed have been covered. Epifanio should also manifest good behavior in the opinion of Marcelino and Telesfora.

More than a year later, Epifanio Gomez dies leaving Paulina Cristobal and their four children. Meanwhile, Marcelino Gomez continued to possess the property, improved it, and earned income from it. He acquired exclusive rights over it when Telesfora conveyed her interest to him. He sold the property with pacto de retro to Banas, redeemable within five years. On April 1, 1918, he redeemed the property from Banas.

Subsequently, Paulina and children filed action to recover property from Marcelino. They claimed that the capital had been covered by the property’s income, hence, the same should be returned to them. The lower court granted their petition. Marcelino appealed. Hence the present petition.

Issue: Whether there was acceptance by Epifanio of the trust agreement.

Held: Yes. Contrary to defendant’s claim that the agreement was kept secret from Epifanio, the testimony of Banas stated that Gomez was present when the arrangement for the repurchase of the property was discussed. Banas even told Epifanio to be thankful that the latter was able to recover the property from Yangco.

Defendants also claim that because Epifanio had not accepted the donation in a public document, the same is unenforceable. This is untenable. Epifanio need not accept in accordance with formalities of donations. The court said that the partnership agreement should be viewed as an express trust, not as an intended donation.

THUS: Heirs of Epifanio entitled to recover the property.