Cabrera vs. CA 163 SCRA 214

Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, and Felisa Gonzaga, Fernando Gonzaga, Aurora Gonzaga, et al.

163 SCRA 214

June 30, 1988

Facts: The parcel of land in dispute was originally owned by Diego and Patricio Gonzaga, the grandparents of the private respondents herein. In 1921, the tax declaration was in the name of the spouses Gonzaga. In 1944 it was made in the name of their child Eliseo Gonzaga. In 1953, it was changed again in the name of Joaquin Cabrera.

In 1970, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of the property from the petitioners in the Court of First Instance. They claimed the property by right of succession. Petitioners claimed by virtue of an alleged sale between them and Eliseo.

During the pendency of the complaint, private respondents’ request that the figures “1960” be changed to “1969” was approved without opposition from Cabrera.

CFI decided in favor of private respondents herein. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

Note: A separate action for registration of the land instituted by Cabrera was pending when the case at the CFI was being heard.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the complaint is barred by laches or prescription?

2. Whether the tax declarations serve as constructive notice because of their nature as public instruments?

3. Whether the action for reconveyance was prematurely filed?

Held:

1. No. The amendment requested by private respondents was allowed without objection from the petitioners. Moreover, this defense should have been pleaded before the amendment was made.

2. No. The Court said it’s strange doctrine that every one is deemed charged with knowledge of every public document simply because it is public in nature. There is no jurisprudence to support the claim.

3. No. The action for reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of decree of registration. There is no reason why one has to wait for the land to be registered before filing such remedy.

Cabrera’s claim that respondents had no valid grounds to support the action for reconveyance is untenable. The latter had established that the transfer of the land had been made under fraudulent circumstances. They also proved that they didn’t receive notice of the registration proceedings and that no notice had been posted on the subject land as required by law.

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Carrantes vs. CA (digest)

Maximino Carrantes vs. Court of Appeals, Bilad Carrantes, Lauro Carrantes, Eduardo Carrantes, and Michael Tumpao

76 SCRA 514

Facts: Mateo Carantes, original owner of Lot No. 44 situated at Loakan, Baguio City, died in 1913 leaving his widow Ogasia, and six children, namely, Bilad, Lauro, Crispino, Maximino, Apung and Sianang,. In 1930, the government, in order to expand the landing field of the Loakan Airport, filed for the expropriation of a portion of Lot. No. 44. Said lot was subdivided into Lots. No. 44A to 44E for the purpose.

In 1913, Maximino Carrantes (MAX) was appointed the judicial administrator of the estate of Mateo. Four heirs, namely, Bilad, Lauro, Sianang, and Crisipino, executed a deed denominated “Assignment of Right to Inheritance” assigning to Max their rights over said lot in 1939. The stated monetary consideration is P1.00. On same date, Max sold Lot Nos. 44B and 44C to the government. One year later the Court of First Instance, upon joint petition of the Carrantes heirs, issued an order cancelling O.C.T. No. 3 and TCT No. 2533 was issued in its place.

On 16 March 1940, Max registered the deed of “Assignment of Right to Inheritance”. Thus, TCT No. 2533 was cancelled and TCT 2540 was issued in the name of Max. A formal deed of Sale was also executed by Max on the same date in favor of the government. Hence, TCT 2540 was cancelled and new TCTs were issued in favor of the government and Max, respectively. On 4 Sept. 1958, Bilad, Lauro, and Crispino, along with the surviving heirs of Apung and Sianang filed complaint in the CFI.

They claimed that the execution of the deed of assignment was attended by fraud. The trial court decided that the action of the heirs had already prescribed since an action on fraud prescribes on four years from discovery of such, in this case, on 16 March 1940 when Max registered the deed of assignment. The Court of Appeals reversed and found that a constructive trust was created. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: 1. whether a constructive trust involves a fiduciary relationship? 2. Whether action had already prescribed?

Held: 1. The court, assuming that there was fraud, and in turn, a constructive trust in favor of the other heirs, said that constructive trust does not involve a promise nor fiduciary relations. Hence, the respondent court’s conclusion that the rule on constructive notice does not apply because there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties lacks the necessary premise.

2. Action had already prescribed because there was constructive notice to the heirs when Maximino registered the deed of assignment with the register of deeds on 16 March 1940. Such date is the reckoning point of counting prescription based on fraud.

Anent respondent court’s contention that constructive trust is imprescriptible, the court said that it is untenable. It is already settled that constructive trusts prescribes in 10 years. In this case, the ten year period started on 16 March 1940. And since the respondents commenced the action only on 4 Sept. 1958, the same is barred by prescription.

***photo borrowed from: (http://k53.pbase.com/o6/78/737778/1/73028960.j0oF4nm7.Rnwy27021606113014BAG.jpg

Ty vs. Ty (digest)

Alejandro Ty vs. Sylvia Ty

553 SCRA 306

Facts: Alexander Ty, son of Alejandro Ty and husband of Sylvia Ty, dies of cancer at the age of 34. Sylvia files petition for the settlement of Alexander’s intestate estate. She also asks court to sell or mortgage properties in order to pay the estate tax amounting to P4,714,560.02 assessed by the BIR. The properties include a parcel of land in EDSA Greenhills, a residential land in Wack Wack, and the Meridien condo unit in Annapolis, Greenhills.

Alejandro Ty opposed the move and filed for recovery of the property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Plaintiff Alejandro claims that he owns the EDSA, Wack Wack and Meridien condo unit because he paid for them. The property was supposedly registered in trust for Alexander’s brothers and sisters in case plaintiff dies. Plaintiff also claimed that Alex had no financial capacity to purchase the disputed property, as the latter was only dependent on the former.

Sylvia countered that Alexander had purchased the property with his money. Alexander was financially capable of purchasing it because he had been managing the family corporations since he was 18 years old and was also engage in other profitable businesses.

The RTC granted the application for preliminary injunction and decides in favor of plaintiff regarding the recovery of the property. CA reversed the RTC stating that the implication created by law under Art. 1448 does not apply if the property was in the name of the purchaser’s child. They agreed that plaintiff partly paid for the EDSA property. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue: whether there was an implied trust under Art. 1448 of the Civil Code?

Held: No, there was no implied trust created in relation to the EDSA property. If the person to whom the title is conveyed is the child of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law under Art. 1448, the so-called purchase money resulting trust. The said article provides an exception: “if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, NO TRUST is IMPLIED by LAW, it being disputable presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.” The Court also noted that plaintiff failed to prove that he did not intend a donation.

Regarding the Meridien Condo and Wack Wack property, the court said that plaintiff failed to prove that purchase money came from him. They also said that Alexander was capable of purchasing the property as he had been working for nine years, had a car care business, and was actively engaged in the business dealings of several family corporations from which he received emoluments and other benefits. Hence, no implied trust created because there was no proof that plaintiff had paid for said properties.

Cristobal vs. Gomez (digest)

Cristobal vs. Gomez

50 Phil. 810

Facts:

Epifanio Gomez owns two parcels of land located in the Jabay, Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite and a lot located in town of Bacoor, Cavite. He sold the property with Pacto de Retro to Luis Yangco, redeemable in five years. The period to redeem expired but Yangco extended it. Gomez approached Bibiano Banas , a relative, to secure a loan. The latter only agreed if Gomez’s brother Marcelino and sister Telesfora would also be responsible for the loan.

On 12 August 1907, Marcelino and Telesfora entered into a “private partnership in participation” for the purpose of redeeming the property from Yangco. Epifanio was present when said agreement was discussed and assented to. The capital consisted of P7000, of which P1500 came from Marcelino, and P5500 from Telesfora. The agreement provided that the property redeemed will be placed in the name of Marcelino and Telesfora, the income, rent, and produce of the property would go to the two and that the property shall be returned to their brother as soon as the capital employed have been covered. Epifanio should also manifest good behavior in the opinion of Marcelino and Telesfora.

More than a year later, Epifanio Gomez dies leaving Paulina Cristobal and their four children. Meanwhile, Marcelino Gomez continued to possess the property, improved it, and earned income from it. He acquired exclusive rights over it when Telesfora conveyed her interest to him. He sold the property with pacto de retro to Banas, redeemable within five years. On April 1, 1918, he redeemed the property from Banas.

Subsequently, Paulina and children filed action to recover property from Marcelino. They claimed that the capital had been covered by the property’s income, hence, the same should be returned to them. The lower court granted their petition. Marcelino appealed. Hence the present petition.

Issue: Whether there was acceptance by Epifanio of the trust agreement.

Held: Yes. Contrary to defendant’s claim that the agreement was kept secret from Epifanio, the testimony of Banas stated that Gomez was present when the arrangement for the repurchase of the property was discussed. Banas even told Epifanio to be thankful that the latter was able to recover the property from Yangco.

Defendants also claim that because Epifanio had not accepted the donation in a public document, the same is unenforceable. This is untenable. Epifanio need not accept in accordance with formalities of donations. The court said that the partnership agreement should be viewed as an express trust, not as an intended donation.

THUS: Heirs of Epifanio entitled to recover the property.

The death of an icon: Cory Aquino

I was in a taxi when I first heard the news that she had passed away. Surprised, but not so much since her condition had been getting worse in the last few days before she died. I remember the time when Rico Yan died (not to say that he's in the same level as Cory) me and my family were in Baguio. In Cory's case, my family was in Baguio again, minus me. Another coincidence is that every time we have a make-up class in Agency a famous person dies. The first time we had one Michael Jackson died. It was our second make-up class when Cory died. I hope we don't have another make-up class in Agency or if we do have one that nobody famous passes away. It's always hard to see an icon die. Aside from the fact that it makes you think of your own mortality, it's also a loss to the world because their influence passes on with them.

Another thought that came to mind is why do the people who oppose Gloria die one by one? Raul Roco died. FPJ died. Now Cory. What's the message? What's God's plan? Maybe through Cory's death Filipinos will be inspired to unite as one people (finally) and change the corrupt system that's dragging us all down.

For now, let's just continue praying for the soul of Cory Aquino and for the betterment of our country (read: making sure that Gloria Arroyo steps down in 2010).

Lorenzo vs. Posadas (digest)

Lorenzo vs. Posadas

64 Phil 353

Facts:

On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal properties. Hanley’s will provides the following: his money will be given to his nephew, Matthew Hanley, as well as the real estate owned by him. It further provided that the property will only be given ten years after Thomas Hanley’s death. Thus, in the testamentary proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga appointed P.J.M. Moore as trustee of the estate. Moore took oath of office on March 10, 1924, and resigned on Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was appointed in his stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue, assessed inheritance tax against the estate amounting to P2,057.74 which includes penalty and surcharge. He filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings so that Lorenzo will be ordered to pay the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest after CFI granted Posadas’ motion. He claimed that the inheritance tax should have been assessed after 10 years. He asked for a refund but Posadas declined to do so. The latter counterclaimed for the additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on the tax and which was not included in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzo’s claim for refund against Posadas. Hence, both appealed.

Issue: Whether the estate was delinquent in paying the inheritance tax and therefore liable for the P1,191.27 that Posadas is asking for?

Held: Yes. It was delinquent because according to Sec. 1544 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, payment of the inheritance tax shall be made before delivering to each beneficiary his share. This payment should have been made before March 10, 1924, the date when P.J.M. Moore formally assumed the function of trustee.

Although the property was only to be given after 10 years from the death of Hanley, the court considered that delivery to the trustee is delivery to cestui que trust, the beneficiary within the meaning of Sec. 1544 (b).

Even though there was no express mention of the word “trust” in the will, the court of first instance was correct in appointing a trustee because no particular or technical words are required to create a testamentary trust (69 C.J.,p. 711). The requisites of a valid testamentary trust are: 1) sufficient words to raise a trust, 2) a definite subject, 3) a certain or ascertained object. There is no doubt that Hanley intended to create a trust since he ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period or for a stated purpose.

***this case was assigned in our Agency and Partnership class. I created this file as a reviewer. I decided to share it with the world, especially law students like me. hope it helped!