Ongsingco vs. Tan

Tasiana Ongsingco vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan and Jose de Borja

July 25, 1955| Bautista Angelo

Facts:

Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was declared incompetent by the CFI of Rizal in Spec. Pro. No. 1764. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is being settled in Spec. Pro. No. 7866 in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.

After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained from threshing the palays until the ownership of the lands has been resolved by the court or by agreement of the parties.

Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only be threshed out elsewhere and not by the probate court. She then filed an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to prevent Jose from interfering with the harvest. The CFI of Nueve Ecija granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Tasiana.

Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay harvested in the disputed lands. Tasian filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari with prohibition in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja?

Held: No. In Franco vs. O’Brien, it was held that “the question of ownership is one which should be determined in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate”. In another case it was held that “the general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings”[1] or stating the rule more elaborately, “When questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings”.[2]

Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such question has been squarely raised in an action pending in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what respondent court merely did was look into the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being interwoven one can hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from the other.

Doctrine: A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction.

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[1] Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561
[2] Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 61

Bonaga vs. Soler

Bonaga vs. Soler

2 SCRA 755 |  30 June 1961

Spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac died in 1935 and 1940, respectively. The probate court appointed Juan Garza as administrator of the estate. Upon application, the probate court authorized Garza to sell certain parcels of land pertaining to the estate. Garza sold parcels of land (consisting of 21 parcels of abaca, coconut, pasture and forest lands with an aggregate area of more than 1,001 hectares) to Roberto Soler.

During World War II, the records of the case were destroyed. Upon reconstitution, the court appointed Julian Bonaga as administrator. Bonaga filed suit, in his capacity as administrator, to annul the sales in favor of Soler. He alleged that said transactions were fraudulent, made without notice to the heirs of Alejandro Ros of the hearing of the application to sell, and that the sales were not beneficial to the heirs for various reasons.

Soler filed three motions to dismiss, the first two were dismissed. He alleged in the third motion to dismiss various grounds including estoppel, prescription, and non-inclusion of necessary parties. The trial court dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action without trial on the merits considering that there is allegation that the sale of the parcels of land to Soler did not comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court?

HELD: Yes, the trial court erred in dismissing the action without a hearing on the merits. The sale did not comply with requisites under the Rules of Court. Among these requisites, the fixing of the time and place of hearing for an application to sell, and the notice thereof to the heirs are essential; and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.

This requirement should apply regardless of the place of residence of those required to be notified under said rule.

Moreover, neither the deed of sale nor the orders issued by the probate court  in connection therewith show whether the personal properties were insufficient to pay the debts and expenses of administration. Neither is there showing that the sale was made for the purpose of paying the debts or expenses of administration

Ty vs. NBI Supervising Agent De Jemil

Arnel U. Ty, MARIE ANTONETTE TY, JASON ONG, WILLY DY, and ALVIN TY, vs. NBI SUPERVISING AGENT MARVIN E. DE JEMIL, PETRON GASUL DEALERS ASSOCIATION, and TOTALGAZ DEALERS ASSOCIATION

G.R. No. 182147 | December 15, 2010 | Velasco, Jr.,J.:

Facts:

Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas Corporation ("Omni"). They are being suspected of engaging in illegal trading of petroleum products and underfilling of branded LPG cylinders in violation of B.P. 33, as amended by P.D. 1865. NBI Agents Marvin De Jemil and Edgardo Kawada conducted surveillance operations on Omni. On 15 April 2004, the NBI Agents carried out a test-buy. Using eight branded LPG cylinders from Shell, Petron and Total, they went to Omni for refilling. Omni refilled the cylinders. The NBI agents paid more than P1500. LPG Inspector Noel Navio found that the LPG cylinders were without LPG valve seals and one of the cylinders was actually underfilled.

On 28 April 2004, Agent De Jemil obtained a search warrant from Pasig RTC branch 167. The NBI seized several items from Omni's premises. Subsequently, Agent De Jemil filed his Complaint-Affidavit before the DOJ. The Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasig found probable cause for violation of BP 33. This was later approved by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno.

Petitioners appealed the decision to the Secretary of Justice, who later reversed the decision of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor. NBI Agent De Jemil moved for reconsideration. Denied. He thus filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Secretary of Justice. It later reversed itself and reinstated the Resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor.

Issues:

(1) Whether the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was proper even if Agent De Jemil did not appeal to the Office of the President?

(2) Whether probable cause exists against petitioners for violations of Sec. 2 (a) and (c) of BP 33, as amended?

(3) Whether petitioners can be held liable therefor?

Held:

(1) YES. The determination of probable cause by the public prosecutor, and, later on, by the Secretary of Justice, is subject to judicial review where it is established that grave abuse of discretion tainted the determination. The aggrieved party need not resort to the Office of the President before availing of judicial remedies because the Secretary of Justice is an alter ego of the President who may opt to exercise or not to exercise his or her power of review over the former’s determination in criminal investigation cases. Also, under the doctrine of qualified political agency, the determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice is presumably that of the Chief Executive unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter.

(2) YES. The test-buy conducted on 15 April 2004 tends to show that Omni illegally refilled the eight branded cylinders. Such act is a clear violation of Sec. 2 (a), in relation to Secs. 3 (c) and 4 of BP 33, as amended.

Omni has no authority to refill LPG cylinders as shown by the certifications provided by Shell, Petron and Total. The seized items also show that Omni has no authority to refill the cylinders. It shows that Omni really refilled branded cylinders without authorization. Omni’s unauthorized refilling of branded LPG cylinders, contrary to Sec. 2 (a) in relation to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended.

Granting arguendo that the customers already owned the LPG cylinders, such fact does give Omni authority to refill the cylinders without authorization from the brand owners. Only the duly authorized dealers and refillers of the brand owners may refill the branded LPG cylinders. The offense of refilling a branded LPG cylinder without the written consent of the brand owner constitutes the offense regardless of the buyer or possessor of the branded LPG cylinder.

Petitioner's contention that they are not liable because the underfilling that took place during the test-buy is an isolated event is UNTENABLE. A single underfilling under BP 33 is already a criminal act.

(3) Only Arnel Ty, as President of Omni, is liable. The other petitioners, who are members of Omni's Board of Directors, are not liable. Sec. 4 of BP 33 enumerates the persons who may be held liable, viz: (1) the president, (2) general manager, (3) managing partner, (4) such other officer charged with the management of the business affairs of the corporation or juridical entity, or (5) the employee responsible for such violation. The Board of Directors is primarily a policy-making body of the Corporation who doesn't concern itself with day-to-day operations.

Vlasons Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Florencio Sosuan purchased two pieces of salvaged bronze propeller from Lo Bu. Thereafter, he filed a civil action in the CFI of Manila for the recovery of possession of the same against Lo Bu and also against persons from whom Lo Bu purchased the same, Alfonso Calixto and Ernesto Valenzuela; and alternatively against Vlasons Enterprises.

A few months before, the same propellers had been seized by virtue of a search warrant issued by another branch of the CFI of Manila presided over by Judge Maceren. It was issued at the instance of Vlasons Enterprises who claimed that a certain Calixto stole the propellers from their vessel that sunk in Bataan. The complaints for theft against Calixto and Valenzuela, as well as the complaint for  Anti-Fencing against Sosuan, were dismissed.

Upon Sosuan’s motion in the civil action for recovery, Judge Cruz authorized Sosuan to take possesson of the propellers pending action. The order pointed out that no criminal action had been filed in connection with the seizure of the propellers in question.

Issues: Whether Judge Cruz erred in 1) authorizing the release of the propellers considering that it was under the custody of Judge Maceren’s court; 2) in ordering the transfer of the propellers to Sosuan pending action?

Held: 1) NO. Where personalty has been seized under a search warrant, and it appears reasonably definite that the seizure will not be followed by the filing of any criminal action for the prosecution of the offenses in connection with which the warrant was issued, the public prosecutors having pronounced the absence of basis therefor, and there are, moreover, conflicting claims asserted over the seized property, the appropriate remedy is the institution of an ordinary civil action by any interested party, or of a special civil action of interpleader by the Government itself. 

The ordinary action and the interpleader are cognizable not only by the court issuing the search warrant (in this case Judge Maceren’s branch) but by any other competent court to which it may be assigned by raffle. In such a case, the seizing court shall transfer custody of the seized articles to the court having jurisdiction of the civil action at any time, upon due application by an interested party. Thus, it was proper for Judge Cruz to order the transfer of the propeller’s to his branch. There is no conflict of jurisdiction because there was no pending criminal action and Judge Maceren’s court was merely acting as custodian of the seized property.

This case is different from the Pagkalinawan case. In Pagkalinawan the same property was being seized at the same time by different courts upon different writs: one by search warrant, the other by writ of seizure issued in a replevin action. There was then a palpable and real conflict in jurisdiction. And the Pagkalinawan ruling was laid down precisely to avoid that conflict in jurisdiction. In the instant case, however, since it was fairly certain that no criminal action could possibly ensue subsequent to or in connection with the search warrant, no such conflict in jurisdiction or in the ultimate disposition of the seized property could be expected to arise.

2) YES. The absence of any criminal prosecution in the Maceren Branch in relation to the propeller has no relevance whatever to the question of whether or not in the civil suit before the Cruz Branch the plaintiff, who claims to be the owner of the propeller, is entitled to its possession pending action as against defendant Vlasons, who also claims to be the owner thereof. Non sequitur. It merely makes necessary the civil suit to precisely resolve that issue. It does not of itself furnish basis for or warrant the transfer of possession from one party to the other in the civil action.

Nothing in the record therefore justifies the Order of Judge Cruz transferring possession of the property in controversy to the plaintiff pendente lite. That relief can be awarded only after trial, by final judgment declaring in whom the title to said property rests. What may be done in the meantime, as already above pointed out, is simply the transfer by the Maceren Branch, upon proper application, of custody over the property to the Cruz Branch, there to await the outcome of the suit

How to Survive (or Conquer) Law School

The essentials. Two highlighters and a
strong dose of caffeine!

It's June once again and school is about to start, and, for some, it has already started. I just graduated (with Honors, luckily!) from Ateneo Law last April but my memories of my first year in law school are still fresh and vivid. Sleepless nights, bad recits, and constant stress. Law school is hard enough. But the harder part during first year is how to adjust to the new environment especially if you didn't take college seriously, or in other words you didn't study, only partied.

Some people would say that law school is only hard during first year, that second year to fourth year would just be a breeze. I beg to disagree. It gets harder and harder every year, not only because the subjects are more complicated, but also because your professors would expect more from you. For example, during first year, some would understand that you're unfamiliar with some legal concepts and terms. But after that, they'll assume you know all of them, more or less. Anyway, without further ado, here are my thoughts on how to survive, or better yet, conquer law school!

1. Read the originals of the assigned cases and avoid relying on digests unless you are really pressed for time. Some professors know how to catch students who didn't read the originals. Moreover, it would be easier to read and understand the original Supreme Court decisions than the digested ones, especially if they are only made by your fellow students. Trust me, you will reap the benefits of this practice once you reach junior and senior year.

2. Read to understand, not to memorize! When reading annotations, statutes, and cases, aim to understand the material instead of memorizing it, unless the professor explicitly tells you to memorize it. It would be better to recall what you read if you understood it. This will do wonders for you during recitations and exams. Plus, some professors give hypothetical situations that can only be answered if you understood what you read. Also, it would be easier to understand the law if you know the purpose or circumstances behind its passage. For example, the Writ of Amparo was passed because of the deficiencies and flaws of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

3. Avoid too much extra-curricular activities! I'm not telling you to be a loner. It's good to have friends in law school so that you have a support group who understands what you're going through. But minimize your involvement in school organizations. At the most, join the Law Journal of your school because you'll hone your writing skills and be familiar with pressing legal issues. If you're the type who likes being busy, then go ahead and join all the organizations you want. Just be prepared to suffer low grades or  get booted out of law school.

4. Get tips from the upper batch. Different professors have different styles. Some don't repeat their questions, some do. Some verbatim, some partially modified. It would be great to know the quirks and style of the professor so that you can tailor fit your study plan accordingly. It would also save you time and effort, and, hopefully, some time to do other things aside from studying.

5. Quality over quantity. When you study, aim for quality instead of quantity. Never mind that one of your classmates has already read the material 3 to 5 times. Stick to your own pace. Even if you studied it only once or twice, you are still better off if you took time to understand, analyze and interweave the law and the court's interpretation of the law.

And finally, never forget to pray. Pray that someone else gets called, not you! Especially if you are not prepared to recite the law or the case!