Cuizon vs. Ramolete

Francisco Cuizon et al. vs. Hon. Jose R. Ramolete

May 29, 1984 | Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:

As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land in Mandaue City docketed as L.R. Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two daughters, Rufina and Irene, to whom the salt beds subject of the controversy was given. In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et al.

Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1972, the decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T. was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978.

During the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother of Francisco et al., adjudicated to herself all the property of Irene including the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the 1971 deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever rights and interests and participation she may have in the property in question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was annotated in T.C.T. No. 10477. Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners.

In 1978, Domingo Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu. Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s estate and asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to deliver the salt to him. The Cebu CFI granted the same.

Issue: Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued in favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels of have been?

Held: No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All said court could do is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is dispute, then the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings.

In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court held that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.”

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was covered by a TCT issued in the name of third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate.

Doctrine: Probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties.

Maloto vs. Maloto

Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, et al. vs. Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto

September 30, 1977 | Fernandez

Facts:

Adriana Maloto died on October 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence. On November 1963, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews respectively, of Adriana Maloto commenced an intestate proceeding in the CFI of Iloilo that was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 1736. They executed an intestate proceeding and divided the estate in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each. The CFI judge approved the partition.

Subsequently, on April 1, 1967, a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the CFI of Iloilo. Aldina et al. were all named as heirs but Aldina and Constancio appeared to have bigger shares in the will than what they received in the extrajudicial partition. There were also dispositions in favor of Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

Aldino and Constancio, along with the other devisees and legatees, filed a motion in S.P. No. 1736 for, among others, the allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto. The CFI judge denied the motion on the ground that the said motion had been filed out of time. The petitioners (Aldino et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC but it was denied on the ground of improper remedy.

The petitioners then commenced S.P. No. 2176 in the CFI of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last will and testament. The probate court dismissed the petition on the basis of the finding of said court in S.P. No. 1736 that the alleged will sought to be probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of S.P. No. 2176 by the CFI of Iloilo was proper?

Held: No. The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto in S.P. No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the proceedings was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. In fact, the probate court in S.P. No. 1736 stated in its order that “Movants should have filed a separate actionfor the probate of the will”. Even this Court, in dismissing the petition for certiorari, said that the more appropriate remedy is a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will.

Thus, the order of the probate court in S.P. No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

Doctrine: It is not proper to make a finding in an intestate proceeding regarding the validity of an alleged will.

Benedicto vs. Javellana

Benedicto vs. Javellana

February 21, 1908 | Torres

Facts:

Maximino Jalandoni, brother of the deceased Maximo Jalandoni, petitioned that the administrator or executor, Julio Javellana, be directed to pay him the sum of P985 which he held, in lieu of the land donated to him in his brother’s will. He alleged that one-half of the hacienda “Lantad” had been bequeathed to him, subject to the payment of certain debts and expenses of the estate; that one-half of said hacienda was sold, the sum of P985 remaining in the possession of Javellana; that Javellana is no longer entitled to retain the P985 since, with the value of the portion inherited by the heirs Francisco Jalandoni and Sofia Jalandoni, there would be more than enough required to pay the other debts and expenses of the estate. 

Javellana alleged that it was not proper to ask, by means of a motion, for the relief that Maximino Jalandoni claimed, but that a complaint should have been filed and action brought against the other legatees or rather against all the parties concerned in the estate, not against the administrator alone. The lower court judge granted the motion.

Issue: Whether Maximino’s claim should be filed in the special proceedings or in a separate action?

Held: In the special proceedings. Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may make must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised.

However, considering that everyone stated by the will are mere legatees they have no right to receive their share of the property of the deceased until after his debts have been paid. Contrary to Maximino’s contention, Francisco and Sofia Jalandoni are not heirs but mere legatees. Thus, since all of them are legatees, the debts and expenses of the estate must be paid pro rate by the legatees in the manner provided in the will.

Doctrine: Every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may make must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action.

Vda. De Manzanero vs. CFI

Remedios Bongon Vda. De Manzanero vs. The CFI of Batangas

August 27, 1935 | Villa-Real

Facts:

Esteban Manzanero, then assistant district engineer of Albay, died in the provincial hospital on February 15, 1935. Fortunato Manzanero, his brother, filed in the CFI of Batangas a sworn  application which was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 3128 alleging that Esteban had his legal residence in Santo Tomas, Batangas; that he had left no property except a life insurance policy of P5,000; that Esteban owed him the sum of P500; that he was survived by a widow, the herein petitioner, Remedios Bongon, residing in Tabaco, Albay.

The CFI issued an order setting said application for hearing at 8:30 A.M. of April 11, 1935, and directing the publication of the notice for the time fixed by law in Kayumanggi. When the application was called for hearing, only Fortunato Manzanero appeared.  Upon petition of the applicant and after making sure that no opposition to the application had been presented, the judge ordered the clerk of court to take evidence in the case. The case was set for hearing in the morning of 22 April 1935 and the corresponding notice thereof sent by registered special delivery to Vda. de Manzanero and Fortunato Manzanero.

The case was called for hearing without the petitioner having appeared to oppose the application. The judge issue an order stating that the deceased was a resident of Santo Tomas, Batangas and directed the summary distribution of the estate to the heirs of the deceased. He also ordered the insurance company to pay to the heirs of the deceased the proceeds of the insurance policy.

After being informed that the proceeds of the policy had been distributed among the heirs of her deceased husband, Vda de. Manzanero filed a motion praying for the return and delivery to her of the money but the presiding judge refrained from trying the case.

Issue: Whether or not the question of jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance of a summary settlement of the estate of a deceased person, by reason of residence, may be raised by means of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari?

Held: According to Sec. 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Rule 73, Sec. 1 of the RoC), the jurisdiction assumed by a CFI for the settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place of residence of a person, or of the location of his estate, cannot be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from the court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

In this case, the want of jurisdiction of said court does not clearly appear on the record. The communication of the municipal treasurer of Tabaco, Albay stating that the deceased resided in Tabaco, Albay before his death does not form part of the record of the lower court.

It not appearing from the orders of the lower court that said court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for summary settlement by reason of the legal residence of the deceased, certiorari does not lie, an appeal being specifically provided in suce case by Sec. 603.

Doctrine: Certiorari does not lie to question the jurisdiction of the court that assumed the settlement of the estate if the want of jurisdiction does not clearly appear on the record. 

Eusebio vs. Eusebio

In the matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. Eugenio Eusebio, petitioner and appellee, vs. Amanda Eusebio, Virginia Eusebio, Juan Eusebio, et al., oppositors and appellants.

December 28, 1956 | Concepcion

Facts:

Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid.

           

The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and overruled his siblings’ objection.

Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?

Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that “domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one own’s health” even if coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent – Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.

The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent. 

Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same.

In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.

Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. It is not changed by presence in a place for one’s own health.

Ongsingco vs. Tan

Tasiana Ongsingco vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan and Jose de Borja

July 25, 1955| Bautista Angelo

Facts:

Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was declared incompetent by the CFI of Rizal in Spec. Pro. No. 1764. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is being settled in Spec. Pro. No. 7866 in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.

After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained from threshing the palays until the ownership of the lands has been resolved by the court or by agreement of the parties.

Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only be threshed out elsewhere and not by the probate court. She then filed an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to prevent Jose from interfering with the harvest. The CFI of Nueve Ecija granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Tasiana.

Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay harvested in the disputed lands. Tasian filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari with prohibition in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja?

Held: No. In Franco vs. O’Brien, it was held that “the question of ownership is one which should be determined in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate”. In another case it was held that “the general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings”[1] or stating the rule more elaborately, “When questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings”.[2]

Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such question has been squarely raised in an action pending in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what respondent court merely did was look into the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being interwoven one can hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from the other.

Doctrine: A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction.

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[1] Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561
[2] Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 61

Bonaga vs. Soler

Bonaga vs. Soler

2 SCRA 755 |  30 June 1961

Spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac died in 1935 and 1940, respectively. The probate court appointed Juan Garza as administrator of the estate. Upon application, the probate court authorized Garza to sell certain parcels of land pertaining to the estate. Garza sold parcels of land (consisting of 21 parcels of abaca, coconut, pasture and forest lands with an aggregate area of more than 1,001 hectares) to Roberto Soler.

During World War II, the records of the case were destroyed. Upon reconstitution, the court appointed Julian Bonaga as administrator. Bonaga filed suit, in his capacity as administrator, to annul the sales in favor of Soler. He alleged that said transactions were fraudulent, made without notice to the heirs of Alejandro Ros of the hearing of the application to sell, and that the sales were not beneficial to the heirs for various reasons.

Soler filed three motions to dismiss, the first two were dismissed. He alleged in the third motion to dismiss various grounds including estoppel, prescription, and non-inclusion of necessary parties. The trial court dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action without trial on the merits considering that there is allegation that the sale of the parcels of land to Soler did not comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court?

HELD: Yes, the trial court erred in dismissing the action without a hearing on the merits. The sale did not comply with requisites under the Rules of Court. Among these requisites, the fixing of the time and place of hearing for an application to sell, and the notice thereof to the heirs are essential; and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.

This requirement should apply regardless of the place of residence of those required to be notified under said rule.

Moreover, neither the deed of sale nor the orders issued by the probate court  in connection therewith show whether the personal properties were insufficient to pay the debts and expenses of administration. Neither is there showing that the sale was made for the purpose of paying the debts or expenses of administration